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High Noon at Arlington Ranch Homeowners Ass’n v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 133 Nev. Adv. 
Op. 66 (Sept. 27, 2017) (en banc)1 
 
PROPERTY LAW: REPRESENTATIONAL STANDING 
 
Summary 
 
 Under NRS Chapters 40 and 116, homeowners associations (HOAs) have the 
representational standing to represent all homeowners who purchase their homes after litigation 
is commenced by or against the HOAs. However, the Court clarified that there is no such 
representational standing to bring or continue to pursue a case on behalf of homeowners who sell 
their units after litigation has begun.2 
 
Background3 
 
 High Noon at Arlington Ranch HOA (High Noon) commenced this litigation against D.R. 
Horton in June 2007 alleging four claims: (1) breach of implied warranties of workmanlike quality 
and habitability; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of express warranties; and (4) breach of 
fiduciary duty. D.R. Horton moved for partial summary judgment in January 2014 arguing that 
when High Noon filed its complaint, only 112 of its 342 members owned units, meaning that High 
Noon’s standing should be decreased to those 112 units. Also, D.R. Horton argued that, for the 
same reason, a subclass of 192 High Noon units for interior claims’ purposes should be decreased 
to 62 units. 
 The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada granted partial summary judgment in favor 
of D.R. Horton, determining that High Noon could not bring claims on behalf of 230 former unit 
owners because they were not real parties in interest in the litigation.4 However, former owners 
could still recover damages suffered in connection with loss of property market value and repair 
expenses and attorneys’ fees incurred by former owners.5 The district court also concluded that 
High Noon representational standing was allowed for subsequent owners of units with existing or 
continuing construction defects. 
 
Discussion 
 
Writ relief is appropriate 
 
 Generally, the Court does not consider partial summary judgment orders because they are 
interlocutory lower court orders. However, here, the Court used its discretion and considered the 
district court’s partial summary judgment order because it raised an important issue. By granting 
                                                 
1  By Homero Gonzalez. 
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 116.3102(1)(d) (2007). The Court applied the 2007 version of the Nevada Revised Statutes 
because High Noon filed its complaint against D.R. Horton in June of 2007. 
3  The Nevada Supreme Court pointed-out that this opinion contains only the relevant facts because the case was 
pending for eight years, and the parties filed multiple motions and writ petitions. 
4  See NEV. R. CIV. P. 17 (2017) (requiring that “[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest.”). 
5  See NEV. REV. STAT § 40.655 (2007) (listing the remedies a claimant can recover for damages “proximately 
caused by a constructional defect”). 
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its discretion, the Court addressed both the legal question at hand and resolved an issue that 
affected other similar litigation. 
 
High Noon’s claims for relief 
 
 The Court first addressed High Noon’s complaint. The Court pointed out that the district 
court ruled on standing without considering each claim alleged in High Noon’s complaint. To 
determine standing, the correct analysis requires that each claim High Noon alleged in its 
complaint relate to the construction defect claims under NRS Chapter 40, which were transferred 
from former unit owners to new unit owners once the unit sale became final. The four claims High 
Noon alleged in its complaint were: (1) breach of implied warranties of workmanlike quality and 
habitability6; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of express warranties; and (4) breach of fiduciary 
duty. 
 The Court defined “constructional defect” as 
 
a defect in the design, construction, manufacture, 
repair or landscaping of a new residence, of an 
alteration of or addition to an existing residence, or 
of an appurtenance and includes, without limitation, 
the design, construction, manufacture, repair or 
landscaping of a new residence, of an alteration of or 
addition to an existing residence, or of an 
appurtenance: 
 
1. Which is done in violation of law, including, 
without limitation in violation of local codes or 
ordinances.7 
 
 The Court declined to address the claims of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, 
and breach of implied warranty of habitability because these claims were not related to 
construction defect claims under NRS Chapter 40. However, the Court found that the claims of 
breach of implied warranty of workmanlike quality and breach of express warranty were 
construction defect claims under NRS Chapter 40, even though High Noon’s complaint stated 
these claims arose out of NRS Chapter 116. The Court reasoned that NRS 40.600 to 40.695 take 
precedence over any other conflicting law related to construction defects8 and that these provisions 
applied to “any” construction defect claims.9 
 
 
                                                 
6  The actual claim was breach of warranty of workmanlike quality and habitability. However, in its discussion, the 
Court analyzed habitability and workmanlike quality separately because they were separate concepts, and were thus 
treated differently for purposes of determining whether or not each was a construction defect claim under chapter 40 
of the Nevada Revised Statutes. In short, habitability was not, but workmanlike quality was. 
7  NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.615 (2007). 
8  NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.635(2) (2007). 
9  Gonski v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 126 Nev. 551, 562, 245 P.3d 1164, 1172 (2010). 
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Under the then-existing statute, homeowners’ associations have standing to represent unit owners 
who purchase units after litigation begins 
 
 NRS 116.3102(1)(d) grants HOAs representational standing rights. The only caveat is that 
the HOA seeking representational standing can only do so if it acts on behalf of two or more of its 
members, and that the actions sought concern the community.10 What makes this a prima facie 
case is that NRS 116.3102(1)(d) does not expressly state whether or not representational standing 
applies to a person who buys a residential unit from a seller who was involved in the HOA’s 
ongoing litigation. The Court found that because NRS 116.095 defined a unit owner as a person 
currently owning a unit, and because there was no restriction placed on subsequent unit owners, it 
then followed that an HOA has representational standing of subsequent unit owners who become 
current owners, but not of former owners who are no longer members of the HOA that brought the 
claim to court.11 
 Furthermore, the Court rejected D.R. Horton’s argument that High Noon’s representational 
standing was limited to the people who owned the units at the time High noon filed suit. By 
considering the Legislature’s intent behind passing NRS 116.3012(1)(d), the Court found that, as 
a matter of policy, not allowing High Noon representational standing for subsequent unit owners 
would have yielded unreasonable results.12 The Court also provided specific examples supporting 
this conclusion by comparing it to what NRS Chapter 4013 states and what other cases within 
Nevada and other jurisdictions have also concluded. 
 
Homeowners’ associations do not have standing to continue to represent unit owners who sell 
units after litigation begins 
 
 The Court addressed D.R. Horton’s argument that High Noon should not retain its 
representational standing over former unit owners because they were no longer members of High 
Noon.14 The Court agreed with D.R. Horton’s argument. First, HOA representational standing only 
applies to current residential unit owners, and former unit owners are no longer members of the 
HOA that commenced litigation. Also, High Noon’s “Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions” made 
it clear that the HOA’s benefits, including any litigation it may bring on behalf of owners, applied 
only to current High Noon members and not prior members. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10  Beazer Homes Holding Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 128 Nev. 723, 731, 291 P.3d 128, 134 (2012). 
11  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 116.095 (2007) (defining “unit’s owner” as “a declarant or other person who owns a 
unit.”). 
12  Barney v. Mt. Rose Heating & Air Conditioning, 124 Nev. 821, 826, 192 P.3d 730, 734 (2008). 
13  Again, chapter 40 of the Nevada Revised Statutes overrides what any other chapter states regarding claims of 
constructional defects. 
14  D.R. Horton actually requested the Nevada Supreme Court issue a writ of mandamus vacating the district court’s 
finding that an HOA could continue to represent its former members, but D.R. Horton made this request in its 
answer rather than in an actual petition. Typically, the Nevada Supreme Court declines to consider these issues, but 
when the error is already apparent in the record, the Court may exercise its discretion sua sponte and address, or 
even rule on that error. Mainor v. Nault, 120 Nev. 750, 774, 101 P.3d 308, 324 (2004) (as corrected on denial of 
rehearing (Apr. 13, 2005)) (quoting Crow-Spieker #23 v. Robert L. Helms Constr. & Dew Co., 103 Nev. 1, 3, 731 
P.2d 348, 350 (1987)). 
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Conclusion 
 
 High Noon’s representational standing of current unit owners is valid. This includes 
representational standing on behalf of new residential unit purchasers who became current High 
Noon members, even though litigation had already begun. However, High Noon may not begin or 
continue litigation on behalf of its former members. The Court issued the writ of mandamus 
vacating the grant of partial summary judgment and ordered the district court to reconsider the 
partial summary judgment motion consistent with this opinion. 
 
